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THE POTENTIAL EXTRATERRITORIAL CONSEQUENCES
OF AKAMAI
Timothy R. Holbrook∗
INTRODUCTION
Patent infringement arises when all of the limitations found in a particular
claim of a patent are present in a device.1 For a patented system, the apparatus
must have all the required components as delineated in the claim.2 For a
patented method, all of the steps of the method must be performed.3
Historically, the issue of “who” was the infringer was relatively
straightforward because most systems and methods were utilized in discrete,
unitary settings. In the modern era, however, particularly with inventions being
implemented over the Internet, the issue of “divided infringement” has arisen
in two particular contexts.4 The first arises when the accused device is owned
by multiple parties, such as an invention that operates over the Internet and
includes one party’s servers and another party’s home computer.5 No one owns
the entire system, and some of the steps of a given method are performed on
the servers while others on the home computer.6 The second form of divided
infringement arises when systems cross international borders.7 For example,
should there be infringement of a U.S. patent if one of the users of an Internetbased invention is located outside of the United States?8
Courts, and particularly the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
have struggled with addressing these scenarios. The result has been a
bifurcated approach that treats patented systems and patented methods
differently. To infringe a patent claiming a system, courts assess who controls
∗

Associate Dean of Faculty and Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law.
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 852 (9th ed. 2009).
2 Cf. Theodore U. Ro et al., Patent Infringement in Outer Space in Light of 35 U.S.C. § 105: Following
the White Rabbit Down the Rabbit Loophole, 17 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 202, 211 (2011) (quoting NTP, Inc. v.
Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
3 Id.
4 See generally Mark A. Lemley et al., Divided Infringement Claims, 33 AIPLA Q.J. 255 (2005).
5 See generally id. at 256–63.
6 See id.
7 See generally id. at 263–67.
8 See id. at 270–71.
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and benefits from the system and where that person is located.9 Thus, there can
be infringement of system claims in these divided situations. In contrast, the
Federal Circuit has offered strict rules for the infringement of patented
methods. To infringe a claimed method, all of the steps of the method must be
performed by a single entity or by someone controlled by that entity.10 Control
is satisfied when the third party is an agent or is under a contractual obligation
to perform the various steps of the method.11 Additionally, all the steps of the
method must be performed within the United States; if a single step of the
claimed method is performed outside of the United States, then there is no
infringement.12
When the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit agreed to
review Akamai Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc.13 and McKesson
Technologies Inc. v. Epic Systems Corp.14 observers believed the court would
address whether and under what circumstances a party could be held liable for
the direct infringement of a patented method when multiple parties perform the
claimed steps.15 As the court characterized the issue:
When a single actor commits all the elements of infringement, that
actor is liable for direct infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). When
a single actor induces another actor to commit all the elements of
infringement, the first actor is liable for induced infringement under
35 U.S.C. § 271(b). But when the acts necessary to give rise to
liability for direct infringement are shared between two or more
16
actors, doctrinal problems arise.

The territorial rules for using systems and methods were not at issue.
Rather than answering the direct infringement question, the court left the
law on direct infringement intact. Instead, it changed the standard for inducing
9

See infra notes 26–29 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 24–25 and accompanying text.
11 Id.
12 Lemley, supra note 4, at 263–64.
13 419 F. App’x 989 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (order granting en banc review).
14 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BIA) 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (order granting en banc review).
15 See Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc)
(per curiam) (“Much of the briefing in these cases has been directed to the question whether direct
infringement can be found when no single entity performs all of the claimed steps of the patent. It is not
necessary for us to resolve that issue today because we find that these cases and cases like them can be
resolved through an application of the doctrine of induced infringement.”); id. at 1319 (Newman, J.,
dissenting) (“Although review of the single-entity rule was the sole reason for this rehearing en banc, and the
sole question briefed by the parties and the amici curiae, this aspect is not resolved by the majority . . . .”).
16 Id. at 1305 (per curiam).
10
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infringement under § 271(b). Now, it is possible to induce infringement even if
no single entity performs all of the steps of the patented method or process, so
long as all of the steps are eventually performed and a party has induced others
to perform those steps.17
The court’s sidestep of the direct infringement issue is problematic. In
particular, the court and commentators have overlooked the court’s potential
expansion of the extraterritorial reach of a patent under § 271(b). Before
Akamai, direct infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) was a prerequisite for
active inducement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b). Section 271(a) contains territorial
limits, and § 271(b) does not. To infringe under § 271(a), the activity must take
place “within the United States.”18 Because active inducement before Akamai
required an act of direct infringement, induced infringement had territorial
constraints.19
This state of affairs may change dramatically after Akamai. There, the
Federal Circuit decoupled active inducement from § 271(a), meaning that
infringement under § 271(b) is free-standing, and infringement is not defined
by reference to other provisions of § 271. The decoupling also means that, as a
statutory matter, the court has removed the territorial constraints from active
inducement. This Article elaborates on this extraterritorial expansion of
§ 271(b), its potential consequences, and a variety of mechanisms that the
Federal Circuit or Supreme Court could implement to limit such reach. At a
minimum, this analysis provides a statutory argument against the Federal
Circuit’s attempt to redefine induced infringement as an independent form of
infringement. More broadly, this Article explores how the Federal Circuit’s

17 See id. at 1306 (“[W]e hold that all the steps of a claimed method must be performed in order to find
induced infringement, but that it is not necessary to prove that all the steps were committed by a single
entity.”). Judge Linn, joined by three other judges, would retain the single-entity rule. See id. at 1337–38
(Linn, J., dissenting). Judge Newman also dissented, but on grounds far different than the other dissenters. She
would reject the single-entity rule for direct infringement under § 271(a). See id. at 1322 (Newman, J.,
dissenting) (“The word ‘whoever’ in § 271(a) does not support the single-entity rule. . . . [W]hen more than
one entity performs all of the steps, the claim is directly infringed.”).
18 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2006). See generally Donald S. Chisum, Normative and Empirical Territoriality in
Intellectual Property: Lessons from Patent Law, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 603, 615–16 (1997); Timothy R. Holbrook,
Territoriality Waning? Patent Infringement for Offering in the United States To Sell an Invention Abroad, 37
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 701, 719–20 (2004). Contributory infringement, however, remains limited to acts within
the United States. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c); see also Chisum, supra, at 615–16. Contributory-like infringement
protection is afforded to exports under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f).
19 Section 271(b) before Akamai could “be used by owners of U.S. patents . . . to reach conduct abroad
that causes direct domestic infringement.” Chisum, supra note 18, at 614.
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decision in Akamai may have expanded the extraterritorial reach of U.S.
patents through the inducement doctrine.
I. ACTIVE INDUCEMENT’S TRADITIONAL LINKAGE TO TERRITORIALLYLIMITED DIRECT INFRINGEMENT
The Patent Act affords rather robust protection to patent owners against
various forms of infringement. Section 271 of the Act delineates what
constitutes infringing acts. The most basic provision is § 271(a), which defines
infringement as arising when an unauthorized person makes, uses, sells, or
offers to sell an invention within the United States or imports the invention into
the United States.20 These infringers can be liable even if they are unaware of
the existence of the patent: Patent infringement is a strict liability offense, and
ignorance of the patent does not preclude liability.21 This Subpart will explore
the law surrounding § 271(a) and § 271(b) as to the doctrine governing direct
infringement, inducement of infringement, and the territorial constraints as to
both.

20

35 U.S.C. § 271(a). Congress has subsequently amended § 271 to include other forms of direct
infringement. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Liability for the “Threat of a Sale”: Assessing Patent Infringement
for Offering To Sell an Invention and Implications for the On-Sale Patentability Bar and Other Forms of
Infringement, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 751, 760–64 (2003); see also Akamai, 629 F.3d at 1307 (per curiam).
Section 271(e)(2) creates a “highly artificial act of infringement,” Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S.
661, 678 (1990), for filing an application for regulatory approval market a patented drug or medical device. 35
U.S.C. § 271(e)(2). Section 271(f) defines infringement as exporting the unassembled components, or a single
component with no substantial non-infringing use, to be assembled overseas, knowing that a patent covers the
item. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1), (2). See generally Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007)
(interpreting § 271(f)). Finally, Section 271(g) makes importing, selling, and offering to sell the product of a
patented process an act of infringement, regardless of where the process is performed. 35 U.S.C. § 271(g).
There is no clear reason why inducement of these forms of infringement could not be “active inducement,” but
the focus of this Article is on § 271(a). These latter two provisions are generally viewed as having
extraterritorial affect because they attempt to regulate activity outside of the United States, but they both
contain some sort of domestic nexus—manufacture within the United States or importation into, or sales or use
within, the United States.
21 Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2065 n.2 (2011) (“[A] direct infringer’s
knowledge or intent is irrelevant.”); see also Jason A. Rantanen, An Objective View of Fault in Patent
Infringement, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1575, 1577 (2011). Knowledge of the patent can result in enhanced damages
for willful infringement, up to treble the amount awarded. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006) (amended 2012); see
also In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc) (establishing standard for
willful infringement).
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A. Infringement, Territorial Limits, and Their Exceptions Under § 271(a)
Section 271(a) defines infringement as making, using, selling, or offering
to sell the claimed invention.22 The plain language of § 271(a) does not create
different forms or requirements for infringement based on the type of invention
in the claim.23 Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit has carved out different rules
for infringement depending on whether the claimed invention is a method or a
system. To infringe a patented method, a single actor must perform each and
every step of the method.24 The slight exception to this rule arises when the
second actor is under the control of the first. The acts of another will be
imputed to the infringer if the other party is the agent of the infringer or has a
contractual obligation to perform the relevant steps of the method.25
In contrast, a party can infringe a patented system by using it, even if it
does not possess or own all of the elements of the system. So long as the user
controls the system and receives the benefit from using the system, there can
be infringement.26 For example, consider if there was a patent on streaming
music online through a system akin to YouTube.27 A person on her laptop,
searching for and playing the movie, has controlled the system and has
benefited from that use (by watching the video). She would be infringing a
patent covering that infringing system. Note, though, that she would not
infringe a method claim because parts of the method would be performed on
YouTube’s servers and others on her own computer.
Section 271(a) also has strict territorial restrictions. All of the infringing
acts must take place “within the United States” or the patented invention must
be imported “into the United States.”28 The express territorial limits in this
22

35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
Section 101 of the Patent Act defines an eligible invention as a “process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter” or any improvements thereof. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
24 Golden Hour Data Sys., Inc. v. emsCharts, Inc., 614 F.3d 1367, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 2010);
Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2008); BMC Resources, Inc. v.
Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1378–79 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
25 Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 629 F.3d 1311, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2010), rev’d and
remanded, 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc).
26 Centillion Data Sys., LLC v. Qwest Comms. Int’l, Inc., 631 F.3d 1279, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2011); NTP,
Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
27 There are quite a few.
28 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). Even the newer forms of infringement are territorially limited. Section 271(e) only
contemplates infringement through filing of applications for regulatory approval to U.S. agencies, thus within
the United States. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e). Sections 271(f) and (g) are both regarded as extraterritorial provisions,
because they attempt to regulate behaviors and markets outside of the United States. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(f),
(g). Nevertheless, even they require an act within or into the United States: manufacture of the component or
23

HOLBROOKS GALLEYSFINAL

504

11/21/2012 9:01 AM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26

provision have led one commentator to consider patent law to be the most
territorial of all of the forms of intellectual property.29
Notwithstanding the plain language of the statute, the Federal Circuit has
afforded patentees some extraterritorial protection under this provision. For
example, an offer made outside of the United States to sell a patented invention
infringes a patent if the contemplated sale will be within the United States.30
Because the offer need not be accepted or completed for there to be
infringement, it is possible for there to be infringement of a U.S. patent even
though no actual conduct has taken place within the United States.31 A patent
on a system can be infringed through use if the control and beneficial use of
the system are within the United States, even if part of the apparatus is outside
of the United States.32 Consequently, §271(a)’s territorial limits have not been
strictly enforced.
In contrast to systems, the Federal Circuit has sharply limited
extraterritorial protection for patented methods by requiring all the steps of the
method to be performed in the United States. There is no infringement of a
method claim if any of the steps are performed outside of the United States.33
As a result, the court has created a dichotomy between patented methods and
systems, not only when multiple parties are involved in the act of infringement
but also when the infringing item straddles the U.S. border, even though the
statute suggests no such bifurcation.34
B. The Extraterritorial Limits of § 271(b) Before Akamai
The acts of direct infringement under § 271(a) contrast with the forms of
indirect infringement found in §§ 271(b) and (c), both in terms of the nature of

components within the United States (for § 271(f)) or importation into, or selling within, offering to sell
within, or using within, the United States (for § 271(g)). See id.
29 Chisum, supra note 18, at 605.
30 Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc., 617 F.3d 1296, 1309
(Fed. Cir. 2010).
31 Id. at 1308; see also Timothy R. Holbrook, Territoriality and Tangibility after Transocean, 61 EMORY
L.J. 1087, 1111–12 (2012).
32 NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“The use of a claimed
system under section 271(a) is the place at which the system as a whole is put into service, i.e., the place where
control of the system is exercised and beneficial use of the system obtained.”).
33 Id. at 1318 (“We therefore hold that a process cannot be used ‘within’ the United States as required by
section 271(a) unless each of the steps is performed within this country.”).
34 Timothy R. Holbrook, Extraterritoriality in U.S. Patent Law, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2119, 2158–59
(2008) (criticizing the “control and beneficial use” test).
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the offenses and their extraterritorial reach. These latter provisions are a
codification of the common law, where parties who were not themselves
infringing the patent were nevertheless found liable for facilitating
infringement by others.35 Although the common law did not differentiate
between inducing infringement and contributory infringement, Congress
divided the concepts when it adopted § 271. Contributory infringement under
35 U.S.C. § 271(c) represented the most common form of indirect
infringement, where a party supplies a component that has no other purpose
than to be used in an infringing device.36 Congress then defined active
inducement of infringement under § 271(b) somewhat ambiguously, treating it
as a catch-all provision for the acts of indirect infringement not covered by
contributory infringement.37
Section 271(b) contains no express territorial restrictions.38 This absence is
conspicuous in light of the restrictions found not only in § 271(a) but also in
§ 271(c).39 Specifically, a person can only contributorily infringe a patent if
she offers to sell or sells within the United States or imports into the United
States a component with no substantial non-infringing purpose.40 Prior to 1994,
§ 271(c) did not contain a territorial restriction.41 That Congress amended
§ 271(c) to be territorially restricted but did not so amend § 271(b) suggests
that Congress intended to afford some extraterritorial reach to § 271(b).42 The
Federal Circuit has confirmed that § 271(b) can regulate activity outside of the
United States. In Merial Ltd. v. Cipla Ltd., the Federal Circuit noted:
Section 271(b) therefore does not, on its face, foreclose liability for
extraterritorial acts that actively induce an act of direct infringement

35 Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1990); see also Timothy
R. Holbrook, The Intent Element of Induced Infringement, 22 SANTA CLARA COMP. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 399,
401 (2006); Mark A. Lemley, Inducing Patent Infringement, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 225, 227–28 (2005);
Lynda J. Oswald, The Intent Element of “Inducement to Infringe” under Patent Law: Reflections on Grokster,
13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 225, 227–31 (2006).
36 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c).
37 Oswald, supra note 35, at 229–30.
38 35 U.S.C. § 271(b).
39 Compare 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (containing no territorial restrictions), with 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)
(containing a territorial restriction), and 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (same).
40 35 U.S.C. § 271(c).
41 Chisum, supra note 18, at 615 (discussing extraterritorial reach of § 271(c) prior to the 1994
amendments).
42 Professor Chisum notes that there is no legitimate policy reason to treat the two provisions differently
in this way. Id. at 615–16. He suggests the amendment to § 271(c) was simply “grammatical indiscretion.” Id.
at 615. However, Congress did not amend the provision in the America Invents Act of 2011. See Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284.
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that occurs within the United States, and Appellants cite no authority
to that effect. We therefore decline to read the statute as being so
43
limited.

As a result, parties can be liable for inducing infringement if their
affirmative acts44 occurred outside of the United States, so long as the acts of
infringement themselves occurred within the United States, as required by
§ 271(a). That territorial limitation on active inducement has its roots in
§ 271(a), not § 271(b). After Akamai, however, infringement under § 271(b), at
least with respect to patented methods, is no longer tied to direct infringement
under § 271(a). Consequently, it is no longer tethered to those territorial limits.
The next Part explores the possible consequences and limits of the severance
of these two provisions on territoriality.
II. HAS AKAMAI ELIMINATED THE TERRITORIAL RESTRICTIONS OF
INDUCEMENT?
In Akamai the Federal Circuit rejected its prior holding that had required an
act of direct infringement in order for there to be active inducement of
infringement under § 271(b). Specifically the court held that there could be
active inducement of infringement if one party, with knowledge of the patent
and with the requisite intent,45 induced a second party to perform the balance
of the steps of a method.
A. The Akamai Decision
In Akamai, and the companion case McKesson Technologies Inc. v. Epic
Systems Corp., the Federal Circuit confronted infringement of patented
methods where more than one party performed the claimed steps. The court
characterized the issue in these cases as follows:
In the two cases before us, we address the question whether a
defendant may be held liable for induced infringement if the

43

681 F.3d 1283, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
Id.; see also DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1305–06 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc)
(approving a jury instruction which stated: “Unlike direct infringement, which must take place within the
United States, induced infringement does not require any activity by the indirect infringer in this country, as
long as the direct infringement occurs here.”). Active inducement requires affirmative steps to encourage the
infringement by others. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936–37
(2005).
45 Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2070 (2011); DSU Med. Corp., 471 F.3d
at 1306.
44
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defendant has performed some of the steps of a claimed method and
has induced other parties to commit the remaining steps (as in the
Akamai case), or if the defendant has induced others to collectively
perform all the steps of the claimed method, but no single party has
46
performed all of the steps itself (as in the McKesson case).

Although most observers believed the court would address the “single
entity” rule of direct infringement, and then necessarily the law of inducement
given its contingency on direct infringement, the court did no such thing. It left
intact the single entity rule for direct infringement of a method claim under
§ 271(a). The court expressly noted that “[b]ecause the reasoning of our
decision today is not predicated on the doctrine of direct infringement, we have
no occasion at this time to revisit any of those principles regarding the law of
infringement as it applies to liability for direct infringement under 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(a).”47
Instead, the court’s decision was specific to active inducement under
§ 271(b). It recognized that, under its prior precedent, active inducement
required proof that there was direct infringement of the patent because “if there
is no infringement, there can be no indirect liability for infringement.”48
Nevertheless, the court overruled its prior decision in BMC Resources, Inc. v.
Paymentech, L.P., that required that a single entity perform all the steps of a
claimed method for there to be inducement of infringement.49 The court
characterized the BMC holding as requiring not only direct infringement but
also that “the direct infringement must be committed by a single actor.”50 The
en banc court believed that the BMC panel grafted two distinct requirements
onto the active inducement standard: an act of direct infringement and a single
entity committing those acts that constitute infringement.51 While the court
agreed with the former, it rejected the latter.
The court concluded that “[r]equiring proof that there has been direct
infringement as a predicate for induced infringement is not the same as
requiring proof that a single party would be liable as a direct infringer.”52 As

46 Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per
curiam).
47 Id. at 1307.
48 Id. at 1308.
49 498 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
50 Akamai, 692 F.3d at 1308.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 1308–09.
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such, the court rejects the single entity rule for induced infringement but
retains the requirement for direct infringement.53
B. By “Divorcing”54 § 271(b) from § 271(a), Has the Federal Circuit Severed
the Territorial Limits?
Although the court still requires “direct infringement,” that definition is no
longer tethered to the extant requirement under § 271(a) that a single actor
perform all of the infringing acts.55 What exactly does it mean, then, for there
to be “direct infringement” without the single entity rule? As Judge Newman
noted in her dissent, “while acknowledging that ‘there can be no indirect
infringement without direct infringement,’ the court holds that there need not
be direct infringers. I need not belabor the quandary of how there can be direct
infringement but no direct infringers.”56
Because the court did not alter the single entity rule for § 271(a), the court
necessarily must be defining “infringement” under § 271(b) independently of
the other provisions.57 It is no longer tethered to § 271(a) explicitly or else the
single entity rule would still apply. The court has previously suggested this
possibility58 and seemingly has walked through that open door.
53 Id. at 1309 (“Nothing in the text indicates that the term ‘infringement’ in Section 271(b) is limited to
‘infringement’ by a single entity. Rather, ‘infringement’ in this context appears to refer most naturally to the
acts necessary to infringe a patent, not to whether those acts are performed by one entity or several.”).
54 Id. at 1338 (Linn, J., dissenting) (“Divorcing liability under § 271(a) from liability under § 271(b) is
unsupported by the statute, subverts the statutory scheme, and ignores binding Supreme Court precedent.”).
55 It is unclear whether the Akamai rule is limited to method claims or could be applicable, for example,
to the use of systems. The Federal Circuit’s initial discussion makes the rule appear to be one of general
applicability to all types of inventions, yet the court itself acknowledges that the rule likely only applies to
patented methods and processes. See Akamai, 692 F.3d at 1305 (per curiam) (“The problem of divided
infringement in induced infringement cases typically arises only with respect to method patents.”). Thus,
generally, the Akamai rule seems to be limited to methods.
56 Id. at 1328 (Newman, J., dissenting); see also id. at 1337 (Linn, J., dissenting) (“To correct this
situation, the majority effectively rewrites these sections, telling us that the term ‘infringement’ was not, as
was previously thought, defined by Congress in § 271(a), but instead can mean different things in different
contexts.”).
57 Cf. id. at 1337 (Linn, J., dissenting) (“Congress has on three occasions made policy choices to treat
certain special circumstances as tantamount to ‘infringement.’ See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2), (f), (g). In doing so,
Congress did not give the courts blanket authority to take it upon themselves to make further policy choices or
define ‘infringement.’”); id. at 1339–40 (“The majority essentially asserts that the word ‘infringement’ in
§ 271(b)—and presumptively § 271(c) as well—can be defined however this court wants without reference to
any statutory provision.”).
58 Joy Techs., Inc. v. Flakt, Inc., 6 F.3d 770, 773 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“Because of the precise language
of the statute it has been suggested that active inducement of infringement under 35 U.S.C. [§] 271(b) (1988)
may be ‘a type of direct infringement.’ We do not use the term here to include infringement under 35 U.S.C.
[§] 271(b).” (citation omitted)).
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Treating § 271(b) as an independent provision, where infringement does
not depend on any other provision of § 271, leaves open the questions of how
the court is defining infringement for that provision and what is the source for
such construction. The court seems to believe that the infringing acts are
somehow incorporated into § 271(b).
Because the single entity rule no longer applies under § 271(b) but does
apply under §271(a), necessarily the court has divorced those two provisions.
However, the court did not offer a source for defining what constitutes
infringement under § 271(b).59 The court drew on common law concepts of
joint tortfeasor liability from tort law,60 yet the Supreme Court has rejected
relying on basic common law as a basis for providing exclusive rights under
the patent laws.61 The lack of a statutory hook for § 271(b)’s definition of
infringement is thus vexing.62 As Judge Linn explained in dissent, the problem
with the majority’s approach “is that there is no statutory basis for concluding
that such independent acts constitute infringement.”63
The territorial issue arises from that separation. Only those acts of
infringement in § 271(a) contain the territorial restriction on the infringement
of a U.S. patent; Section 271(b) contains no such limit. By making § 271(b) its
own, independent form of infringement, then theoretically it is possible to
induce infringement of a patent anywhere. Specifically, by divorcing § 271(b)
infringement from § 271(a), the majority has, at least on a prima facie basis,
severed the territorial limits found in § 271(a). The question now arises as to
the extraterritorial scope of the active inducement provision.
Looking to the statute provides no answer as a textual matter. Under the
Federal Circuit rule, there is “direct” infringement if all of the steps of the
method are performed, regardless of who actually performs those steps.
59 Cf. Akamai, 692 F.3d at 1338 (Linn, J., dissenting) (“Patent infringement is not a creation of common
law.”). If the source is from the common law pre-dating the 1952 Act, then one could question whether the
acts of offering to sell or importing the invention should qualify as these were only added to the statute in the
1994. See Holbrook, supra note 18, at 763.
60 Akamai, 692 F.3d at 1312 (per curiam) (“The analogy to tort law is particularly telling because for
induced infringement under section 271(b) the courts look to the common law principles of joint
tortfeasance.”).
61 Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 525–26 (1972) (“Under the common law the
inventor had no right to exclude others from making and using his invention. If Laitram has a right to suppress
Deepsouth’s export trade it must be derived from its patent grant, and thus from the patent statute.”).
62 See Akamai, 692 F.3d at 1339 (Linn, J., dissenting) (“The idea of defining infringement separately in
the context of § 271(a) and (b) is simply unsupported by the text itself.”).
63 Id. at 1341.
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Suppose, then, that we have the scenario in the NTP v. Research in Motion
case, where one step of the claimed method is performed outside of the United
States.64 The court in NTP concluded there was no direct infringement of the
method because, to infringe, all of the steps of the method must be performed
within the United States.65 As a result, there could be no inducement of
infringement because of the absence of a direct infringer.66 If even one step is
performed outside the United States, then there is no infringement. The
reasoning for the “all steps” requirement, however, is found not in § 271(b) but
instead in § 271(a). According to the court, “use” of the method must be within
the United States, and a single step being performed outside of the U.S.
contravenes the “within the United States” requirement of § 271(a).67 This
strict requirement for the territorial limits on methods parallels the single entity
rule: the former requires all steps of the process be performed in the US while
the latter requires all the steps of the method be performed by a single entity
(with the agent/contractual obligation exception).
The question that Akamai leaves open is the extent to which the “all steps”
territorial rule from NTP survives in the context of induced infringement. By
removing § 271(a) as a prerequisite to induced infringement, it seems that the
strict territorial rule should also be removed.68 Conceivably, one could induce
infringement of a method claim when performance of the method straddles
territorial borders. There could be inducement of a method, such as in the NTP
case, under the reasoning of Akamai: If an actor induces performances of all
the steps of the method, even if one step is outside the United States, then there
could be liability under § 271(b).69
Of course, because § 271(b) now has its own definition of infringement, a
more extreme example is possible. Could a party induce someone else to
perform the entire method outside of the United States? Is there infringement
of a U.S. patent? If the sole provision at issue is § 271(b), then there is no

64

Cf. id. at 1328 (Newman, J., dissenting) (discussing NTP’s inducement analysis).
NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 This argument is akin to Judge Linn’s dissent in Akamai, where he suggests that the
repair/reconstruction doctrine is tied to § 271(a), which suggests that divorcing § 271(a) from § 271(b) is
inappropriate: “Not being liable under § 271(a) based on the doctrine of permissible repair is indistinguishable
from not being liable under § 271(a) based on the fact that no one has made, used, offered for sale, or sold the
patented invention, i.e., no one has performed a complete act of direct infringement.” Akamai, 692 F.3d at
1340 (Linn, J., dissenting).
69 See Holbrook, supra note 31, at 1119.
65
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statutory basis to conclude that such inducement is not an act of infringement.
Indeed, there would be no statutory basis to reject an active inducement claim
for the most extreme situation—where a party outside of the United States
actively induces someone to perform the steps of the method outside of the
United States. There is no tie to the United States at all. By defining active
inducement exclusively under § 271(b), with no dependency on any other
infringement provisions, the Federal Circuit has removed any express
territorial restriction.
Certainly this cannot be the case. Particularly as to the last example, where
there is no nexus to the United States, there should not be infringement of the
patent. Patents remain creatures of national law and, as the Supreme Court has
noted several times, generally they have no extraterritorial affect.70 Given the
presumption against extraterritoriality, then there would be no infringement
under the facts of the extreme example. Congress has not spoken to expanding
the reach of U.S. patents this way,71 which means that the courts as an
interpretive measure should not afford such protection.
That said, the presumption only resolves the extreme hypothetical. What
about the situations where the system crosses borders, so there is some sort of
nexus to the United States, as was the case in NTP? The presumption does not
appear to answer that question, particularly since Congress seemingly did
intend to provide some extraterritorial reach to § 271(b).72
It would be rather odd, however, for the court to interpret § 271(b) to retain
the “all steps” rule of NTP. The NTP court was interpreting § 271(a), not
§ 271(b). Just as the single entity rule is tied to § 271(a), so is the all steps rule.
To discard the former without discarding the latter is inconsistent. There is
certainly nothing in the statutory text to suggest that one rule applies while the
other would not. There is simply no legitimate basis for rejecting the single
entity rule of BMC while retaining the all steps territorial rule of NTP.
Yet using a strict territorial approach would also be inconsistent with the
Federal Circuit’s interpretations of § 271(a) that afford some extraterritorial
70 E.g., Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 442 (2007); Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram
Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 531 (1972); Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. 183, 195–96 (1856).
71 Cf. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2883 (2010); Timothy R. Holbrook, Should
Foreign Patent Law Matter?, 34 CAMPBELL L. REV. 581, 603–06 (2012) (discussing applicability of Morrison
to the ITC and patent context).
72 See Chisum, supra note 18, at 615–16 (discussing the amendment of § 271(c) and failure to amend
§ 271(b)).
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protection to U.S. patent holders. It would be incongruous to afford
extraterritorial protection for using or offering to sell an invention, where the
statute specifically contains territorial restrictions, and not to do so where the
statute is silent (and implicitly Congress has embraced some extraterritorial
scope). Some extraterritorial protection for active inducement seems
appropriate.
The problem remains as to where to draw the line. How much activity in
the United States would be considered enough of a use? One step? A majority
of the steps? The court could resort to the analysis it used for system claims,
locating the use of the method wherever control of the system performing the
method lies and wherever the benefit from using the method flows.73 This
approach would eliminate the bifurcated approach currently used for patented
methods and systems. Oddly, that bifurcation would remain for direct
infringement purposes.
A final approach to cabining the extraterritorial reach of induced
infringement would be to expressly consider the law of the countries in which
the activities take place. The baseline principle would be as follows: If there
would not be infringement of the patent in the foreign country, then there
would be no infringement of the United States. As I have advocated
elsewhere,74 this approach takes into account potential conflicts with foreign
law, which is one of the justifications for the presumption against
extraterritoriality. Others have offered alternatives that could be used as well.75
Nevertheless, in order to effect a balance between protecting U.S. patent
holders and avoiding conflicts with the jurisdictions in which the infringing
acts would arise, some sort of consideration of conflicts would be appropriate.

73 See Centillion Data Sys., LLC v. Qwest Comms. Int’l, Inc., 631 F.3d 1279, 1283–84 (Fed. Cir. 2011);
NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
74 Holbrook, supra note 34, at 2163–91 (offering a comprehensive, conflicts-based approach to
extraterritorial application of U.S. patents); see also Holbrook, supra note 31, at 1115–19 (offering a conflictsbased approach post-Transocean); Holbrook, supra note 18, at 748–58 (offering a rubric particular to
infringing offers to sell).
75 E.g., Elizabeth M.N. Morris, Comment, Territorial Impact Factors: An Argument for Determining
Patent Infringement Based Upon Impact on the U.S. Market, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.
351, 351–53 (2006); Bridget A. O’Leary Smith, Note, NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd.: Losing Control
and Finding the Locus of Infringing Use, 46 JURIMETRICS J. 437, 438 (2006); Kendra Robins, Note,
Extraterritorial Patent Enforcement and Multinational Patent Litigation: Proposed Guidelines for U.S.
Courts, 93 VA. L. REV. 1259, 1279–86 (2007); Melissa Feeney Wasserman, Note, Divided Infringement:
Expanding the Extraterritorial Scope of Patent Law, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 281, 302–03 (2007).
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CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit took a unique step in Akamai by redefining active
inducement of patent infringement. The above analysis demonstrates, however,
that the decision leaves open some difficult questions about the extraterritorial
consequences of that approach. At a minimum, this Article demonstrates a
potential flaw in the statutory interpretation that the court afforded § 271(b),
which could be used to support Supreme Court review or, if certiorari is
granted, reversal. Assuming the Akamai decision stands, however, the courts
will need to define and perhaps confine the extraterritorial limits of the
provision. One hopes that the Federal Circuit and district courts consider, if not
embrace, the literature that has explored this issue, particularly in the context
of systems and methods that straddle territorial lines.

